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Cool Minds in Heated Debates? Migration-related 
Attitudes in Germany Before and After a Natural 
Intervention
Claudia Diehl, Institute of Sociology, University of Göttingen, Germany
Jan-Philip Steinmann, Institute of Sociology, University of Göttingen, Germany
Data from the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey was used to investigate whether the debate surrounding Thilo Sarrazin’s immigration-skeptical 
Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abolishes itself) had any impact on migration-related attitudes in Germany. The book was published in August 2010 
and fieldwork took place during the evolving debate, providing a unique opportunity to study the impact of a major media event on public attitudes. De-
scriptive findings on the aggregate level show no substantial change in migration-related attitudes in the months after publication. More detailed findings re-
veal a significant increase in skepticism only for respondents with low levels of education, whose assessment of Muslim migrants’ integration became more 
negative during the debate. There are two possible reasons for the lack of more substantial attitudinal change. Firstly, the debate was highly polarized and 
lacked the consonant national media coverage that is an important precondition for media effects on public opinion. Secondly, there were no additional “ex-
ternal shocks” prior to the book’s release, such as a high levels of immigration, that could have made the public more susceptible to criticism of the impact 
of migration.
In the late summer of 2010, the German debate on the topic 
of immigration suddenly gained great momentum when the 
book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany abolishes itself) 
was published. Written by Thilo Sarrazin, then a board mem -
ber of the German Bundesbank, the book was the number 
one bestseller for twenty-one weeks (www.buchreport.de) 
and according to media data the top-selling political book in 
post-war Germany (www.buchmarkt.de). Many political 
leaders including the Chancellor and the Federal President 
commented on the case, and for weeks it was almost imposs-
ible to switch on the TV or open a newspaper without hear-
ing or reading about Sarrazin’s book. The public debate was 
not focused only on its substantive claims. It also discussed 
whether the author was “finally” telling the truth that the 
German public had not been allowed to hear out of political 
correctness – or whether he was hiding blatantly racist ideas 
under a blanket of distorted scientific facts. Some reviewers – 
though a minority – pictured the book as a “fearless” attempt 
to at last enlighten the public about the failed integration of 
Muslim migrants (Kelek 2010), while others applied Sarra-
zin’s picture of migrants to his book: “uneducated, rapidly 
proliferating, and way too fat” (Bernard 2010).
In this article, we examine whether and to what extent the 
debate had a short- or medium-term impact on migration-
related attitudes. As already mentioned, the debate was very 
visible in the media (even though the book was probably 
bought by many but read by few). Given the importance of 
news reports in shaping public attitudes on this topic 
(Schlueter and Davidov 2011; Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 
2009; Lubbers, Scheepers, and Vergeer 2000), it is an interest-
ing question whether Germans became more skeptical in 
their assessment of the economic and cultural impact of im-
migration on Germany and of migrants’ integration, or if at-
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers 
for their thorough reading of our paper and for their 
detailed and helpful comments.
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titudes remained stable throughout the debate. We also 
consider whether education, political orientation, and ex-
posure to the debate had a mediating effect on the influence 
of this event on migration-related attitudes.
We analyze data from the cross-sectional survey “Trans-
atlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI)” that has been con-
ducted annually since 2008 by the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States (GMF). While many surveys collect data 
on public attitudes toward migration-related issues, this one 
is unique in asking much more specific questions on topics 
such as the perceived success of Muslims’ integration; the 
economic and cultural impact of immigration; attitudes 
about high- and low-skilled migration; and satisfaction with 
government performance in this field. By chance, the field-
work for the 2010 wave started just a few days before the 
publication of Sarrazin’s book. This coincidence of a heated 
public debate about the consequences of migration with the 
collection of public opinion data on the same topic turned 
TTI 2010 in Germany into a natural experiment.
We will begin by outlining Sarrazin’s position on immi-
gration and integration, before presenting the relevant the-
oretical explanations for migration-related attitudes and 
the mechanisms through which the debate may have af-
fected them. After describing the data, measurements, and 
methodology used in our analyses we will show if and how 
public attitudes changed over the course of the debate.
1. The “Sarrazin Debate”
Deutschland schafft sich ab was officially published on Au-
gust 30, 2010, but excerpts began appearing in the mass-
circulation Bild newspaper from August 23. The debate 
gained momentum in September when Sarrazin appeared 
in several talk shows, the Bundesbank prepared his removal 
from office (he resigned on September 9), and the Social 
Democratic Party looked into the possibility of expelling 
him. By September 13 the book was a number one be-
stseller, and remained so until February 5, 2011. By early 
October – only one month after publication – more than 
one million copies had been sold.
The book’s general strategy is to formulate emotive and 
provocative statements and to “prove” them with allegedly 
“hard” but – convoluted and distorted – data and facts. 
The main topics relevant for this paper are immigration; its 
impact on Germany’s culture, demography, public services, 
economy, and crime rates; and the supposed failure of inte-
gration of Muslim migrants. Sarrazin considers the immi-
gration of Muslims to be a direct threat to German liberal 
culture and lifestyle (2010, 266) and claims that this cul-
tural threat is even more problematic because this group 
does not make any meaningful contribution to the German 
economy. When it comes to explaining Muslim migrants’ 
allegedly failing integration, he discusses cultural and 
motivational aspects (260–65, 286–99). According to Sarra-
zin, discrimination is not a contributing factor in this 
group’s lagging integration (287). Instead, cultural back-
wardness and Islam itself are held responsible, in com-
bination with a lack of interest in becoming independent 
and being successful: “A lack of integration is due to the at-
titudes of Muslim immigrants” (289, translated, italics in the 
original). Sarrazin expects this situation to worsen in the 
future because he considers second and third generation 
migrants to be even more likely to apply for social benefits 
instead of engaging in the labor market (264, 284). More-
over, Muslim migrants have higher fertility rates than 
native Germans, especially when compared to more edu-
cated German women (347). In essence, the allegedly ad-
verse effects on Germany’s culture, economy, demography, 
and crime rates, as well as Muslim migrants’ supposedly 
failing integration even in the second and third generation 
are the focus of the migration-relevant chapters of the 
book. As we will show below, several items included in the 
TTI survey capture public attitudes on these very issues. 
Before describing the data in greater detail, we need to con-
sider why one would expect these attitudes to be affected 
by the Sarrazin debate at all.
2. The Debate and Migration-Related Attitudes: Two Possible Mechanisms
2.1. The Impact of the Media on Perceptions of Economic and Cultural Threat
Theoretical approaches focusing on perceived or real com-
petitive threat feature prominently when it comes to ex-
plaining migration-related attitudes. After all, they offer 
explanations for differences across contexts or changes over 
time in the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment. Theories 
of realistic group conflict emphasize the role of threat to real 
group interests, practices and resources; group-threat theory 
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emphasizes more strongly “the perception of threat to domi-
nant group prerogatives” (Quillian 1995, 588, italics added). 
Increased group competition enhances ingroup solidarity 
and susceptibility to outgroup devaluation (Sherif and She-
rif 1979, 11). The latter is met with collectively shared feel-
ings of superiority, social distance, and fear of status loss 
(Blumer 1958, 3–4). These dynamics have been shown re-
garding migrants in general (Schneider 2008, 62) as well as 
regarding Muslims specifically (Velasco González et al. 2008, 
678). Competitive threat can take different forms, most im-
portantly economic or cultural. Rising numbers of migrants 
and worsening economic conditions have been identified as 
important factors increasing (perceived) group threat 
(Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Quillian 1995).
Not all individuals are affected to the same degree by 
changes in these conditions; rather, the impact of macro-
level changes on individual attitudes is mediated by indi-
vidual characteristics. Perceptions of economic threat are 
influenced by socio-structural variables such as education 
or occupational status: “Individual-level characteristics in-
dicate in part which individuals are most vulnerable to ex-
pressing prejudice when they perceive that their group is 
threatened” (Quilian 1995: 591). Cultural threat, i.e. per-
ceived threats to collective identity and national homo-
geneity, is mostly mediated by individual-level variables 
such as political orientation or type of national identity 
(Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428).
Negative reports about immigrants in the media have also 
been shown to foster perceptions of economic or cultural 
threat and to increase anti-immigrant attitudes. Blumer al-
ready demonstrated in the 1950s that attitudes about a 
seemingly subordinate and distant group are not the result 
of personal experiences but formed in the “public arena”: 
“public figures of prominence … are likely to be the key 
figures in the formation of the sense of group position and 
in the characterization of the subordinate group” (1958, 6). 
Sarrazin, who already had acquired a certain reputation – 
and popularity – for talking “frankly” about societal prob-
lems during his time as Berlin’s Finance Minister, certainly 
was such a “public figure.” In a similar vein, the media de-
bate sparked by the publication of his book could have af-
fected how people thought about migration (rather than 
just the topic’s general salience), a phenomenon called sec-
ond-level agenda setting (Balmas and Sheafer 2009). The 
“evaluative tone in the media” about a certain issues causes 
what Sheafer calls the “affective priming” of political issues 
(or candidates) (2007). At least some media outlets, most 
importantly the high-circulation German tabloid Bild, re-
peatedly framed Sarrazin’s statements as a brave attempt to 
address problems no one dares talk about, most import-
antly Muslim migrants’ supposedly failing integration.
Different effects of the media on migration-related attitudes 
have been identified: direct effects, through exposure to dif-
ferent types of newspapers that cover, for example, the topic 
of “ethnic crime” in various ways (Lubbers, Scheepers, and 
Verger 2000), and indirect effects concerning the relationship 
between changes in the general media coverage of migration 
issues and migration-related attitudes (Boomgaarden and 
Vliegenthart 2009). The idea behind indirect effects is that 
even those who do not follow news reports on migrants 
themselves are affected by media debates on the issue be-
cause they talk about this issue with friends and relatives. 
The empirical studies reviewed so far provide at least some 
empirical evidence that negative reports on the topic of mi-
gration in the media increase levels of perceived migration-
related threat. A lag of one or two months is considered to be 
the most relevant time period for the impact of news reports 
on migration-related attitudes (Schlueter and Davidov 2011; 
Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2009). Even if the debate 
under consideration here is certainly a special type of media 
coverage, it seems quite plausible that Sarrazin’s book would 
have affected the attitudes under consideration. On the one 
hand, it could have increased perceptions that native Ger-
mans and migrants compete for scarce resources such as so-
cial benefits. On the other hand, Sarrazin’s statements about 
“culturally distant” Muslim migrants unwilling to integrate 
but rapidly becoming demographically ascendant may have 
strengthened fears that “Germanness in Germany is getting 
more and more diluted” (Sarrazin 2010, 393, translated).
2.2. Shifting Perceptions About the “Right” Answers to Migration-Related 
Survey Questions
There is, however, another mechanism by which the book 
could have affected not necessarily native Germans’ mi-
gration-related attitudes but their answers to survey ques-
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tions about the issue. The latter can be biased by “social 
desirability”: If there are strong norms about seemingly ap-
propriate answers to questions on a certain topic, some re-
spondents are likely to skew their answers accordingly. As 
outlined above, Sarrazin’s supporters claimed that he had 
finally said out loud what no-one dared to say because it 
was “politically incorrect.” This element was, for example, 
very strong in the arguments put forward by supporters 
such as Necla Kelek (2010). The issue of “Denkverbote” 
(“political taboos”) played an important role in the debate, 
so it is quite possible that the perception of social norms 
about “appropriate” answers to migration-related survey 
questions changed in the course of the debate. Theor-
etically, these norms might be seen as the standard against 
which respondents’ answers are evaluated before they are 
reported (Strack 1994). Consequently, a shift in perceptions 
of these norms may have led to more “honest” answers be-
cause the formerly perceived gap between the answers re-
spondents want to give and the answers they perceive as 
being socially acceptable could have narrowed during the 
debate. This could have been the case especially for those 
who have always been skeptical of immigration but did not 
want to admit it because they felt that this violated the 
norm of positive attitudes on the issue. As research has 
shown, this feeling is shared by respondents with higher le-
vels of education and political liberals in particular (Janus 
2010; Stocké 2007).
The two mechanisms presented in this section lead to dif-
ferent conclusions about which subgroups of natives 
should have been affected by the debate: As already men-
tioned, perceived economic and cultural threat is usually 
stronger among individuals with low levels of education, 
conservative political ideologies, and an ethnic national 
identity. Changing perceptions of what it is socially desir-
able to think about migrants and immigration should, in 
turn, mainly affect the highly educated and liberals. We 
thus expect both groups to have been affected by the de-
bate, even though the underlying mechanisms may differ. 
And finally, we expect attitudinal change to have been most 
pronounced among those who have had a high direct or 
indirect exposure to the debate, i.e. who followed mi-
gration-related topics closely in the news or discussed them 
frequently with friends. We will now turn to the analysis of 
changes in respondents’ answers to migration and inte-
gration-related questions over the course of the Sarrazin 
debate.
3. Data, Measurements, and Methodology
As already mentioned in the introduction, the following 
analyses are based on data from the survey “Transatlantic 
Trends: Immigration” (Gustin and Ziebarth 2010). The 
main aim of this cross-sectional survey is to collect data on 
public attitudes to migration and integration-related is-
sues. It has been conducted by the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States every year since 2008 in six European 
countries as well as the United States and Canada (the 
number of countries included in the survey changes 
slightly between years). Computer-assisted telephone inter-
views (CATI) with one thousand randomly sampled adults 
per country were conducted by TNS Opinion.
Depending on the item under consideration, the analyses 
presented here are based on data collected in Germany be-
tween 2009 and 2011. Our main focus lies on data collected 
in 2010: the book was officially released on August 30, 
2010, three days after the beginning of the fieldwork, and a 
heated public debate evolved during the two weeks in 
which the fieldwork continued. Furthermore, the survey 
was repeated two months later in November 2010 (with 
different respondents) when it became clear that this 
would offer an opportunity to study the medium-term im-
pact of the Sarrazin debate on migration-related attitudes. 
Furthermore, many items asked in 2010 were also used in 
2009 and 2011. Taken together, these data allow for a de-
tailed analysis of the debate’s short- and medium-term im-
pact on public perceptions of immigration and integration 
in Germany. Only respondents with at least one parent 
born in Germany are included in the analyses1. This re-
duces the number to about nine hundred.
1 We excluded Germans and non-Germans from 
the analyses where both parents had immigrated to 
Germany so that it is clear to which group our find-
ings refer. Unfortunately, there were not enough 
members of minorities in the dataset to analyze 
their attitudes separately (see discussion).
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3.1. Dependent Variables: Attitudes on the Impact of Migration and on 
(Muslim) Migrants’ Integration
Since the choice of dependent variables follows the relevant 
content of the book, we analyze public attitudes on the im-
pact of immigration and on (Muslim) migrants’ integration. 
Attitudes on the impact of immigration are frequently 
measured with item batteries that ask about respondents’ 
perceptions of the impact of migration on national culture, 
on the economy, and on public safety (Zick, Küpper, and 
Wolf 2010; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; McLaren 2003; for 
Germany: Fertig and Schmidt 2011; Rippl 2008). Items on 
the impact of migration often focus on job competition be-
tween native Germans and migrants. However, since Sarra-
zin’s point is not that migrants take jobs away from native 
Germans but that they tend to abstain from work and live 
on benefits instead, we concentrate on the following aspects 
of perceived cultural and economic threat:
Impact of Migration:  
(a) Culture: Some people think that immigration enriches 
German culture with new customs and ideas. Others think 
that these new customs and ideas negatively affect German 
culture (two-point-scale: immigration enriches German cul-
ture – immigration negatively affects German culture)  
(b) Social benefits: Legal immigrants are a burden on social 
services like schools and hospitals (four-point scale: strongly 
agree – strongly disagree)
Items about integration measure respondents’ perceptions 
of how well migrants should or do adapt to their new con-
text. Available data suggest that it is important to dif-
ferentiate between specific groups of immigrants when it 
comes to public perceptions of integration. In Germany, 
perceived cultural and social distance is much greater to-
wards Turks than towards other immigrant groups (Blohm 
and Wasmer 2008). This is most likely related to Turks’ 
mostly Muslim background. Survey research shows that a 
large majority of Germans thinks that Muslim migrants 
prefer to segregate (Leibold and Kühnel 2006, 144). More-
over, recent studies show that Muslims are perceived as a 
group that tends to be aggressive, egoistical, arrogant, and 
intolerant, as well as supporting terrorist activities and 
showing fundamentalist tendencies (Fischer et al. 2007, 379; 
Wike and Grim 2010, 18; Zick and Küpper 2009, 3). About 
one third of the German public holds Islam-critical attitudes 
(Leibold and Kummerer 2011, 321). This general skepticism 
about Muslims could have been fueled by Sarrazin’s book: 
As outlined above, Sarrazin makes a point of drawing a line 
between “good” migrants and “bad” Muslim migrants who 
are allegedly responsible for “70 to 80 percent of all prob-
lems in the fields of education, labor market, public 
transfers, and criminal behavior” (2010, 262, translated). In 
a second step, we will thus focus on items that capture native 
Germans’ assessment of (Muslim) migrants’ integration:
Evaluation of Integration:  
(c) Generally speaking, how well do you think that (split 
sample: Muslim immigrants / immigrants in general) are in-
tegrating into German society? (four-point scale: very well – 
very poorly)
Half of respondents were asked about Muslim migrants’ 
integration and half about migrants’ integration in general. 
This enables us to analyze whether Sarrazin’s dif-
ferentiation between “good” and “bad” migrants found in-
creasing support during the course of the debate.
3.2. Independent Variables: Education, Political Orientation, Direct and In-
direct Exposure to the Debate
As mentioned above, the differentiation between native 
Germans with high and low levels of education is crucial for 
our analyses. Native Germans with low levels of education 
can be expected to feel more threatened by migrants econ-
omically, while skilled native Germans are more likely to 
give socially desirable answers to migration-related survey 
questions, a tendency that may have decreased during the 
debate. Here we draw the line between those who have at-
tained university entrance qualifications (Abitur), and those 
who have less school education. A closer look at this vari-
able reveals that the sample is skewed towards the better-
educated native Germans in both waves (see Table 1). This 
does not cause a severe problem for our analyses, though, 
since we are interested in change over time and not so much 
in the absolute level of migration-related skepticism.
Starting out from a cultural threat perspective, additional 
independent variables gain importance: Migration-
related threat to ingroup integrity and status is higher for 
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those who see migrants as outgroup members per se. This 
is expected to be more strongly the case for individuals 
with an ethnic national identity than for those with a 
civic-cultural national identity (Diehl and Tucci 2010; 
Lewin-Epstein and Levanon 2005; Hjerm 1998). In TTI 
2010, national identity is captured by asking respondents 
which preconditions they consider to be most important 
for migrants’ naturalization. Since this question on 
national identity yields a very skewed distribution, we 
take a closer look at respondents’ political orientation in 
our analyses instead (center/right versus left). This vari-
able is not only closely related to national identity, it can 
also be expected to be an important predictor of per-
ceived migration-related cultural threat (Semyonov, Raij-
man, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428).
In order to capture respondents’ exposure to the debate we 
include in our analyses the following two items that can 
serve as proxies for direct and indirect exposure, respect-
ively:
How closely do you follow news about immigration and im-
migrant integration issues in Germany? When you get to-
gether with friends, would you say you discuss immigration 
matters frequently, occasionally, or never?
As control variables we include age, sex, and – since East 
and West Germans still differ in terms of migration-related 
attitudes (Diehl and Tucci 2010) – region in our analyses. 
With regard to age we compare young and middle-aged 
with elderly respondents since age is only included as a 
grouped variable in the data set.
In the empirical section we analyze whether and how the 
answers to the aforementioned items changed over the 
course of the Sarrazin debate – at the aggregate level and 
separately for native Germans with high versus low le-
vels of education, for those with a center/right versus a 
left-wing political orientation, and for those who have 
had more or less exposure to the debate, either directly 
(following news) or indirectly (talking with friends). 
This will tell us whether attitudes that typically vary be-
tween these subgroups became more polarized in the 
course of the debate. In order to study change over time, 
we built a time-dependent variable grouping two to four 
days of interviewing, so that we ended up with eight 
time units spread over the first wave (before and directly 
after publication of the book) and the second wave (two 
months later) of data collection. Table 1 presents a de-
scriptive overview of the dependent and independent 
variables.2
2 The differences between wave 1 and wave 2 are 
not statistically significant, except for education 
(p < .05).
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Dependent variables
Share of native Germans thinking that immigration negatively affects German culture
Share of native Germans “strongly” or “somewhat” agreeing that immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals
Share of native Germans thinking that that immigrants in general are integrating “very poorly” or “poorly” into German society
Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim immigrants are integrating “very poorly” or “poorly” into German society
Independent variables
Education (lower level of education)
Political orientation (center-right)
Discussing immigrant matters with friends (frequently)
Following news about immigration (very closely)
Control variables
Age (55–65+)
Sex (male)
Region (eastern Germany)
Wave 1
32.1
26.8
57.4
74.0
53.5
56.6
11.5
32.7
43.4
46.9
19.8
Wave 2
34.7
30.9
50.9
72.0
46.4
61.1
11.0
28.9
43.8
47.3
20.3
Table 1: Distribution of model variables by wave (percentages)
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
4. Findings
4.1. Was There Any Attitudinal Change on the Aggregate Level?
We will first take a closer look at the development of di-
rect and indirect exposure to the Sarrazin debate. During 
the period under consideration, no other migration-
related issue was very prominent in the media. We can 
thus safely assume that any change in intensity with which 
respondents followed the news on the issue or talked 
about it with friends must be related to the Sarrazin de-
bate (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Share of native Germans following the topic in the news “very closely” and talking with friends “frequently” about migration issues by date of interview (percent)
* Answer categories: very closely, fairly closely, not very closely, not closely at all; ** Answer categories: frequently, occasionally, never
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) 2010, own calculations
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In fact, we can see that after the book launch in late August, 
Germans followed the news on this issue significantly more 
closely and discussed the topic with friends more often than 
before. By mid-November at the latest, levels had returned al-
most back to “normal” again: The topic seems to be less pro -
minent in the media or was at least not followed very closely 
any longer, and the issue was no longer discussed significantly 
more often with friends than before the official book release.3
If we now turn to the perceived cultural impact of migration 
we find that migration-related attitudes remained relatively 
stable throughout the course of the debate. Even though 
many respondents did obviously follow the debate, Sarra-
zin’s worries that his offspring will live in a country that has 
lost its “cultural and intellectual capacity” (2010, 392) were 
not shared by the German public, at least not more strongly 
than before the publication of the book (Figure 2).
3 For all bivariate analyses, statements about stat-
istical significance are based on comparisons be-
tween interviews conducted during August 27–30 – 
i.e. before the official publication of the book – with 
those conducted during one of the seven later inter-
view periods (p < .05).
Figure 2: Share of native Germans thinking that immigration negatively affects German culture and “strongly” or “somewhat” agreeing that immigrants 
are a burden on social services like schools and holspitals by date of interview (percent)
* Answer categories: immigration enriches German culture, immigration negatively affects German culture; ** Answer categories: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) 2009, 2010, and 2011, own calculations
The slight increase between late August and early November 
2010 is statistically insignificant. This overall rather optimistic 
view about the impact of migration on German culture is also 
demonstrated by other studies (Semyonov, Raijman, and Go-
rodzeisky 2008, 12). As outlined above, the claim that many 
Muslim migrants show little inclination to work but prefer to 
live on social benefits features prominently throughout the 
book. The graph shows a (statistically significant) increase in 
worries about migrants being an economic burden between the 
beginning of wave 1 and the beginning of wave 2. It should also 
be noted, however, that overall approval of this item was lower 
in 2010 than in the year after the debate, which raises the ques-
tion whether this increase can really be attributed to the “Sarra-
zin debate.“ Furthermore, the comparatively high instability in 
attitudes might be caused by the examples of social services 
given in the question wording (“schools and hospitals”). These 
two issues are less prominent in the public debate in Germany 
than in many other countries surveyed by TTI, e.g. the United 
Kingdom or the United States. In the German context, this item 
may thus measure so-called “non-attitudes” that are usually in-
stable and thus hard to “explain” (Converse 1964).
The items presented so far refer to migrants in general. As 
outlined above, Sarrazin draws a sharp distinction between 
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“good” and “bad” (i.e. Muslim) migrants. We therefore 
analyze whether the German public follows Sarrazin’s 
differen tia tion – and whether it gained salience during the 
course of the debate. Fortunately, a closer look at the TTI 
data can settle this question, because in 2010 a new item 
was inserted into the questionnaire asking about the per-
ception of migrants’ integration. Half of the sample was 
asked about migrants in general, half of the sample about 
Muslim migrants in particular. The distribution of answers 
to these questions is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim immigrants/immigrants in general are integrating into German society “very poorly” or “poorly” 
by date of interview (percent)
* Answer categories: very well, well, poorly, very poorly
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) 2010 and 2011, own calculations
We can see, first of all, that Muslim migrants’ integration is 
regarded with substantially greater skepticism than the in-
tegration of migrants in general, a finding that has also 
been shown for other European countries such as Spain 
and the United Kingdom (Transatlantic Trends: 2010, 29). 
While the size of the gap between the attitudes toward mi-
grants in general and toward Muslim migrants in par-
ticular widened in the course of the debate, this was mostly 
because attitudes towards immigrants in general became 
slightly more positive over time (p < .10).
4.2. Did Subgroups of Native Germans React Differently to the Debate?
We have already been able to show that overall assessments of 
the impact of migration and of migrants’ integration did not 
change substantially in the course of the debate. This may 
seem surprising given that we deliberately analyzed those 
items that refer to the specific issues raised by Sarrazin: Mi-
grants as a threat to German culture, a burden on social ser-
vices, and not willing or able to integrate. However, before we 
rush to the conclusion that the debate made no difference to 
migration-related attitudes, we need to take a more detailed 
look at how specific subgroups reacted. According to the the-
oretical arguments outlined above, it is quite possible that 
native Germans with low levels of education, conservative 
political orientations, and more exposure to the media debate 
were more susceptible to Sarrazin’s arguments than others 
who may even have started – in defiance of the book’s claims 
– to feel more positive about the issue. In order to look into 
this possibility, we ran several regression models on the vari-
ables analyzed so far (models including standard errors can be 
found in tables 2A–4A in the appendix). The first model con-
tains the independent variables described above, while models 
2 to 4 contain additional interaction terms between date of in-
terview and education (model 2), political orientation (model 
3), and exposure through debates with friends (model 4). 
Since direct exposure did not have any significant effect on at-
titudes we concentrate in the following on the variable “talk-
ing with friends frequently about migration issues.”
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Table 2: “Immigration negatively affects German culture” (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)
Note:+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
Independent variables
Education (ref. = high level of education)
Political orientation (ref. = left)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)
Control variables
Age (ref. = 18–54)
Sex (ref. = female)
Region (ref. = western states)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)
Wave 1:  31.08.–02.09.10
 03.09.–06.09.10
  07.09.–10.09.10
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10
 12.11.–15.11.10
 16.11.–19.11.10
 20.11.–24.11.10
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends
Constant
Nagelkerke R2
Model 1
0.985***
0.927***
1.137***
–0.036
0.386**
0.609***
–0.343
–0.395+
–0.415+
0.242
–0.353
–0.314
–0.108
–2.044***
0.174
Model 2
1.351***
0.929***
1.131***
–0.035
0.386**
0.616***
–0.057
–0.225
–0.154
0.435
–0.081
0.073
0.026
–0.511
–0.312
–0.446
–0.340
–0.491
–0.662
–0.235
–2.251***
0.176
Model 3
0.997***
1.104**
1.164***
–0.035
0.388**
0.606***
–0.212
–0.579
–0.462
0.311
–0.313
0.033
0.254
–0.209
0.232
0.058
–0.116
–0.086
–0.539
–0.575
–2.165***
0.177
Model 4
0.989***
0.959***
1.739*
–0.067
0.374**
0.626***
–0.457+
–0.392
–0.451+
0.322
–0.258
–0.137
–0.102
0.612
–0.464
–0.255
–1.050
–1.206
–1.890+
–0.397
–2.080***
0.185
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With respect to the perceived impact of migration on Ger-
man culture (Table 2), the picture outlined above is overall 
confirmed. The basic model reveals that migration-related 
attitudes do not show a clear pattern over the course of the 
debate: The variable “date of interview” yields only a few 
statistically significant negative (!) effects. Along with the 
characteristics that increase perceived migration-related 
cultural threat in general (low levels of education, conser-
vative political orientations, living in eastern Germany), 
talking with friends about migration-related issues is as-
sociated with a substantially more negative assessment of 
the cultural impact of migration. The models including in-
teraction terms show that attitudinal stability over the 
course of the debate is also found for subgroups dif-
ferentiated by level of education and political orientation. 
Contrary to our theoretical expectation that exposure to 
the debate would render respondents more immigration-
skeptical in their attitudes, model 4 shows that those who 
talked about migration-related issues with their friends be-
came slightly less rather than more skeptical in the course 
of the debate. Of course, we do not know what kind of 
causality is at work here, but in this case it seems unlikely 
that the effective theoretical mechanism is that those talk-
ing to friends had more exposure to the debate. It seems 
more likely that those respondents who are more immi-
grant-friendly started to talk about the issue more often, 
most likely because they were outraged by the debate. This 
would also explain what we briefly mentioned above: that 
direct exposure (“following the news on the issue very 
closely”) does not have an effect – as models not presented 
here show. Given the very specific conditions under which 
media effects on public attitudes become evident (Zaller 
1996) this finding should not come as a surprise, as we will 
discuss in more detail in the last section.
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Table 3: “Immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals” (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)
Independent variables
Education (ref. = high level of education)
Political orientation (ref. = left)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)
Control variables
Age (ref. = 18–54)
Sex (ref. = female)
Region (ref. = western states)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)
Wave 1:  31.08.–02.09.10
 03.09.–06.09.10
  07.09.–10.09.10
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10
 12.11.–15.11.10
 16.11.–19.11.10
 20.11.–24.11.10
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends
Constant
Nagelkerke R2
Model 1
0.503**
0.354*
0.420+
0.170
0.100
0.086
0.253
0.174
–0.686+
0.496
0.083
–0.169
0.268
–1.681***
0.062
Model 2
0.565
0.356*
0.422+
0.168
0.109
0.096
0.359
0.189
–0.477
0.473
–0.095
–0.016
0.329
–0.212
–0.026
–0.321
0.076
0.319
–0.263
–0.115
–1.723***
0.064
Model 3
0.518**
0.358
0.470+
0.191
0.088
0.101
0.606
–0.082
–0.950
–0.162
–0.017
0.285
0.491
–0.522
0.408
0.429
0.954
0.135
–0.802
–0.367
–1.703***
0.079
Model 4
0.492**
0.353*
1.227+
0.189
0.064
0.085
0.211
0.393
–0.619
0.684*
0.145
0.004
0.347
–0.003
–1.813+
–0.628
–2.302+
–0.480
–1.494
–0.677
–1.761***
0.077
Note: + p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
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The models on migrants’ perceived economic impact (see 
Table 3) yield similar results, though the model fits the data 
less well. This confirms the above-mentioned suspicion 
that the survey question does not capture the debate on 
this issue in the German context.
Notwithstanding this note of caution, we can see in 
model 3 that those who hold conservative or moderate 
political attitudes became somewhat more skeptical in 
the course of the debate with a peak in skepticism at the 
beginning of wave 2. However, this finding is again not 
statistically significant. Model 4 shows once more that 
those who talked about migration-related issues with 
friends became less skeptical in the course of the debate 
whereas at the beginning of wave 1, those who talked 
about this issue with their peers had been significantly 
more skeptical.
Our multivariate analyses on attitudes about Muslim mi-
grants’ integration show that these are unrelated to respon-
dents’ education (see Table 4). This finding is in sharp 
contrast to what we know about the factors influencing the 
sort of anti-immigrant attitudes that are mostly captured 
in surveys (Coenders and Scheepers 2003).
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Table 4: “How well do you think that Muslim immigrants are integrating into German society?”1 (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)
Independent variables
Education (ref. = high level of education)
Political orientation (ref. = left)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)
Control variables
Age (ref. = 18–54)
Sex (ref. = female)
Region (ref. = western states)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)
Wave 1:  31.08.–02.09.10
 03.09.–06.09.10
  07.09.–10.09.10
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10
 12.11.–15.11.10
 16.11.–19.11.10
 20.11.–24.11.10
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends
Constant
Nagelkerke R2
Model 1
0.251
0.519**
0.274
0.071
0.466**
0.746**
0.155
0.293
0.064
–0.124
0.161
–0.385
0.026
0.199
0.064
Model 2
–0.624
0.544**
0.308
0.053
0.496**
0.791**
0.273
–0.026
–0.129
–0.879*
–0.300
–0.857+
–0.755
–0.057
0.750
0.528
2.146**
1.021
1.025
1.739*
0.562
0.094
Model 3
0.253
0.020
0.264
0.032
0.456*
0.802**
0.385
–0.190
–0.488
–0.325
–0.393
–0.743
–0.256
–0.453
0.936
1.134
0.417
0.988
0.674
0.543
0.465
0.079
Model 4
0.247
0.537**
0.335
0.072
0.457*
0.743**
0.123
0.217
–0.014
0.055
0.189
–0.350
–0.032
0.508
0.508
0.511
–1.438
–0.337
–0.322
0.780
0.194
0.076
1 “very well” or “well” = 0; “very poorly” or “poorly” = 1
Note: + p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001; Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
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However, we can see in model 2 that the attitudes of 
native Germans with high and low levels of education 
became more polarized during the debate. Native Ger-
mans with low levels of education became significantly 
more skeptical, more educated native Germans less so. 
This polarization peaked at the beginning of wave 2. 
With respect to respondents’ assessment of Muslim mi-
grants’ integration, there is no evidence that political 
orientation influenced reactions to the debate. Talking 
with friends about migration issues did not have any sig-
nificant impact on integration-related attitudes either, 
even though the coefficients show a similar pattern as in 
tables 2 and 3.
For ease of interpretation, the predicted values for edu-
cated and uneducated native Germans’ attitudes towards 
Muslim migrants’ integration are shown in Figure 4. We 
calculated these separately for the groups that run a high 
versus a low risk of being skeptical about Muslim mi-
grants’ integration in term of the other independent 
variables included in the model: The “low risk group” in-
cludes younger, female, liberal Germans living in the 
western part of the country who talk about migration is-
sues rarely or occasionally whereas the high risk group 
includes older conservative males living in Eastern Ger-
many who talk about migration issues with friends fre-
quently.
Figure 4: Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim migrants are integrating into German society “very poorly” or “poorly”: predicted probabilities 
by date of interview and level of education (percent)
We can see that the increase in skepticism was strongest 
for uneducated individuals in the low-risk group, while 
individuals in the high-risk group were already so skep-
tical about Muslim migrants’ integration before the debate 
started that a further increase was by nature limited. In 
both groups, educated respondents became more positive 
in their assessment of Muslim migrants’ integration dur-
ing the debate. Apparently they either wanted to distance 
themselves from Sarrazin’s statements or they received 
new information on the issue during the debate (e.g. from 
those criticizing Sarrazin) that rendered their assessment 
of Muslim migrants’ integration more positive.
* “low risk group”: liberal female from West Germany between 18 and 54 who is talking “occasionally” or “never” about migration issues
** “high risk group”: conservative or centrist male from East Germany at least 55 who is talking “frequently” about migration issues
Note: Predicted values were calculated based on Model 2 in Table 5.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) 2010, own calculations
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5. Summary and Discussion
We used data from the “Transatlantic Trends: Immi-
gration” survey to investigate whether and to what extent 
the heated German debate about Thilo Sarrazin’s Deutsch-
land schafft sich ab, published in late August 2010, had an 
impact on migration-related attitudes. We analyzed public 
opinion data from 2009, from the days before and the first 
weeks after the release of the book in 2010, from about two 
months after the end of wave 1, and from 2011, one year 
after the publication of the book.
Our most important finding is that there was no substan-
tial and enduring change in migration-related attitudes 
during the period considered here. The slight increase in 
general worries about migrants being a burden on social 
services is most likely unrelated to the debate, but reflects 
instead a general instability in responses to this question. 
We further analyzed if overall attitudinal stability can also 
be found for specific subgroups that usually differ in their 
evaluation of the consequences of migration, i.e. native 
Germans with high and low levels of education, with right 
and left wing political orientations, and with weak or 
strong exposure to the debate. Most importantly, these 
analyzes reveal that native Germans with low levels of edu-
cation were evaluating Muslim migrants’ integration sig-
nificantly more negatively by mid-November (i.e. by the 
beginning of wave 2) than at the time of the book’s pre-
release or one year before. With regard to both topics, mi-
grants being an economic burden and Muslim migrants’ 
integration, the moderate increase in migration-skeptical 
attitudes peaked by the beginning of wave 2. This finding 
is in accordance with results from earlier studies which 
show that news reports on migration are most likely to af-
fect attitudes with a time lag of about one to two months. 
In fact, it is quite possible that skepticism was temporarily 
even higher between the end of wave 1 and the onset of 
wave 2.
Overall, however, public opinion on the issue is not as vol-
atile as one might think. People seem not to have taken the 
alleged “facts” the book claims to have “revealed” at face 
value. Those who were skeptical about immigration and in-
tegration before the book’s appearance probably felt con-
firmed by Sarrazin’s statements while those with a more 
positive opinion remained optimistic and joined the broad 
alliance of those who met its publication with criticism. 
While both sides held onto their beliefs, there is only li-
mited evidence that they became more polarized during the 
debate. In terms of their attitudes, the societal subgroups 
differentiated here did not in most cases react differently to 
the debate. One exception is the polarization of attitudes 
on Muslim migrants’ integration between native Germans 
with high and low levels of education. Our findings do not 
support the idea that educated and liberal native Germans 
became more likely to express immigration-skeptical at-
titudes during the debate, as might have been expected on 
the basis of research on social desirability.
Even though we are confident that the modest dynamic in 
attitudes we found, mainly with regard to uneducated 
native Germans’ perceptions of Muslim migrants’ inte-
gration, was in fact related to the debate that evolved dur-
ing fieldwork, it is, strictly speaking, difficult to link the 
debate causally to attitudinal change using the indicators at 
hand. Rigorous empirical proof that whatever change we 
found was caused by the publication of the book and the 
subsequent debate would require more detailed in-
formation on respondents’ indirect and direct exposure to 
the debate via discussions with friends and consumption of 
different media outlets – plus a content analysis of the way 
the debate was covered in these various outlets. Research 
shows that what is important is not whether migrants are 
present in the media, but whether they are evaluated posi-
tively or negatively in news reports (Boomgaarden and 
Vliegenthart 2009). Unfortunately, the data we used con-
tained no information on the kind of news outlets respon-
dents were exposed to.
The fact that we found little overall increase in migration-
related skepticism raises the question of why these attitudes 
remained rather stable in the course of a debate that was in 
many regards unique in its intensity. There are two possible 
explanations for this: First of all, it is possible that the “Sar-
razin debate” was perceived not so much as a debate about 
migrants being a problem for the country but more about 
whether or not Sarrazin’s assumptions were racist. As we 
describe in the introduction, this led to a polarized debate 
with some media outlets asserting that Sarrazin was bravely 
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discussing fundamental problems and others criticizing the 
book and commenting on the positive aspects of migration 
for the country. An important precondition for media ef-
fect on public opinion was thus missing: overall consonant 
coverage of the issue in the national media (Peter 2004; see 
also Zaller 1996). Secondly, it is known that news reports 
affect attitudes on immigration primarily when there are 
additional external shocks such as high levels of immi-
gration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). As outlined 
above, the topic of migration was not very salient in Ger-
many before the book was published, so it did not fall on 
very fertile ground in terms of already heightened levels of 
perceived threat.
One rather unfortunate shortcoming of our analyses is the 
fact that TTI data enabled us to study the impact of the de-
bate on the attitudes of native Germans only. As in many 
surveys, the number of migrants included in TTI is too 
small to analyze them separately, especially if one is inter-
ested in migrants with a Muslim background (for ex-
ceptions see Fassmann 2011; Kühnel and Leibold 2003). 
What it meant to Muslim minority members living in Ger-
many to be the focus of a debate on their adverse impact 
on the society to which they belong is hard to say though 
easy to imagine. Our analyses thus cannot answer the 
tricky question of whether the debate had a negative im-
pact on integration processes in Germany. Given native 
Germans’ overall attitudinal stability it seems unlikely that 
there will be a direct effect, for example, in terms of in-
creasing levels of discrimination against Muslims. How-
ever, we cannot rule out the possibility that Muslims’ 
perceptions of their social acceptance have become more 
pessimistic. Being sociologists we know that this can itself 
have an impact on societal reality, according to Thomas’ fa-
mous dictum “if men define situations as real, they are real 
in their consequences.”
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Appendix
Table 2A: “Immigration negatively affects German culture” (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)
Independent variables
Education (ref. = high level of education)
Political orientation (ref. = left)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)
Control variables
Age (ref. = 18–54)
Sex (ref. = female)
Region (ref. = western states)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)
31.08.–02.09.10
03.09.–06.09.10
07.09.–10.09.10
09.11.–11.11.10
12.11.–15.11.10
16.11.–19.11.10
20.11.–24.11.10
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends
Constant
Nagelkerke R2
Model 1
.985* (.125)
.927* (.128)
1.137* (.184)
-.036 (.121)
.386* (.121)
.609* (.149)
-.343 (.239)
-.395 (.240)
-.415 (.246)
.242 (.241)
-.353 (.244)
-.314 (.243)
-.108 (.228)
–2.044* (.218)
.174
Model 2
1.351* (.352)
.929* (.129)
.131* (.184)
-.035 (.122)
.386* (.121)
.616* (.150)
-.057 (.366)
-.225 (.385)
-.154 (.420)
.435 (.348)
-.081 (.368)
.073 (.380)
.026 (.347)
-.511 (.485)
-.312 (.494)
-.446 (.520)
-.340 (.492)
-.491 (.494)
-.662 (.495)
-.235 (.465)
–2.251* (.291)
.176
Model 3
.997* (.126)
1.104* (.357)
1.164* (.185)
-.035 (.122)
.388* (.121)
.606* (.150)
-.212 (.405)
-.579 (.434)
-.462 (.417)
.311 (.418)
-.313 (.457)
.033 (.402)
.254 (.373)
-.209 (.502)
.232 (.523)
.058 (.516)
-.116 (.513)
-.086 (.544)
-.539 (.503)
-.575 (.470)
–2.165* (.308)
.177
Model 4
.989* (.126)
.959* (.130)
1.739* (.856)
-.067 (.123)
.374* (.122)
.626* (.151)
-.457 (.254)
-.392 (.255)
-.451 (.264)
.322 (.252)
-.258 (.254)
-.137 (.251)
-.102 (.239)
.612 (.1.019)
-.464 (.966)
-.255 (.974)
–1.050 (1.001)
–1.206 (1.017)
–1.890 (1.019)
-.397 (.986)
–2.080* (.222)
.185
Note: * p < .05, SE in parentheses.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
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Table 3A: “Immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals” (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)
Independent variables
Education (ref. = high level of education)
Political orientation (ref. = left)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)
Control variables
Age (ref. = 18–54)
Sex (ref. = female)
Region (ref. = western states)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)
Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10
 03.09.–06.09.10
 07.09.–10.09.10
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10
 12.11.–15.11.10
 16.11.–19.11.10
 20.11.–24.11.10
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends
Constant
Nagelkerke R2
Model 1
.503* (.168)
.354* (.173)
.420 (.246)
.170 (.164)
.100 (.165)
.086 (.212)
.253 (.315)
.174 (.315)
-.686 (.369)
.496 (.327)
.083 (.335)
-.169 (.339)
.268 (.310)
–1.681* (.292)
.062
Model 2
.565 (.471)
.356* (.174)
.422 (.247)
.168 (.165)
.109 (.165)
.096 (.213)
.359 (.461)
.189 (.488)
-.477 (.602)
.473 (.468)
-.095 (.519)
-.016 (.518)
.329 (.466)
-.212 (.633)
-.026 (.639)
-.321 (.761)
.076 (.663)
.319 (.683)
-.263 (.148)
-.115 (.625)
–1.723* (.387)
.064
Model 3
.518* (.170)
.358 (.482)
.470 (.250)
.191 (.166)
.088 (.166)
.101 (.214)
.606 (.526)
-.082 (.526)
-.950 (.612)
-.162 (.597)
-.017 (.602)
.285 (.521)
.491 (.502)
-.522 (.656)
.408 (.659)
.429 (.769)
.954 (.720)
.135 (.728)
-.802 (.690)
-.367 (.639)
–1.703* (.413)
.079
Model 4
.492* (.170)
.353* (.176)
1.227 (.726)
.189 (.167)
.064 (.166)
.085 (.214)
.211 (.348)
.393 (.337)
-.619 (.405)
.684* (.345)
.145 (.359)
.004 (.362)
.347 (.337)
-.003 (.920)
–1.813 (1.008)
-.628 (1.038)
–2.302 (1.337)
-.480 (1.093)
–1.494 (1.111)
-.677 (0.949)
–1.761* (.306)
.077
Note: * p < .05, SE in parentheses.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
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Table 4A: “How well do you think that Muslim immigrants are integrating into German society?”1 (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)
1 “very well” or “well” = 0; “very poorly” or “poorly” = 1; Note: * p < .05, SE in parentheses.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.
Independent variables
Education (ref. = high level of education)
Political orientation (ref. = left)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)
Control variables
Age (ref. = 18–54)
Sex (ref. = female)
Region (ref. = western states)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)
Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10
 03.09.–06.09.10
 07.09.–10.09.10
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10
 12.11.–15.11.10
 16.11.–19.11.10
 20.11.–24.11.10
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends
Constant
Nagelkerke R2
Model 1
.251 (.183)
.519* (.182)
.274 (.290)
.071 (.183)
.466* (.179)
.746* (.265)
.155 (.349)
.293 (.356)
.064 (.362)
-.124 (.344)
.161 (.361)
-.385 (.334)
.026 (.343)
.199 (.288)
.064
Model 2
-.624 (.491)
.544* (.185)
.308 (.294)
.053 (.185)
.496* (.182)
.791* (.270)
.273 (.523)
-.026 (.519)
-.129 (.539)
-.879* (.447)
-.300 (.495)
-.857 (.468)
-.755 (.468)
-.057 (.710)
.750 (.712)
.528 (.729)
2.146* (.783)
1.021 (.724)
1.025 (.666)
1.739* (.702)
.562 (.362)
.094
Model 3
.253 (.185)
.020 (.482)
.264 (.293)
.032 (.186)
.456* (.181)
.802* (.268)
.385 (.516)
-.190 (.512)
-.488 (.504)
-.325 (.532)
-.393 (.550)
-.743 (.496)
-.256 (.512)
-.453 (.699)
.936 (.710)
1.134 (.730)
.417 (.697)
.988 (.732)
.674 (.668)
.543 (.685)
.465 (.369)
.079
Model 4
.247 (.185)
.537* (.184)
.335 (1.135)
.072 (.184)
.457* (.180)
.743* (.267)
.123 (.359)
.217 (.372)
-.014 (.379)
.055 (.365)
.189 (.376)
-.350 (.349)
-.032 (.354)
.508 (1.598)
.508 (1.398)
.511 (1.397)
–1.438 (1.330)
-.337 (1.432)
-.322 (1.317)
.780 (1.573)
.194 (.293)
.076
